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4. Avoiding a Hard Irish Border: Time to Move from
Magical Thinking to Specific Solutions 
Katy Hayward 
Progress on the issue of Northern Ireland/Ireland must be made before the European 
Council summit in June 2018. For this to happen, the UK government has to put forward 
proposals that meet the commitments it made in the Joint Report of December 2017. 
These included avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland, protecting North-South 
cooperation and supporting the all-island economy and the operation of the 1998 
Agreement. 
Any proposal from the UK government must be more substantive than those ideas 
offered in its August 2017 position paper and in any of the Prime Minister’s speeches. 
The EU has criticised those proposals as ‘magical thinking’. UK ministers’ vague but 
repeated references to as yet untested ‘technological solutions’ fail to reassure the EU, 
which is concerned that its strict trade rules can be enforced, will be enforced and will 
be seen to be enforced by post-Brexit UK. 
In this way, the Northern Ireland/Ireland issue is a litmus test for the UK’s whole 
approach to its future relationship with the EU. What it puts forward in terms of 
avoiding a hard Irish border demonstrates its grasp of the implications of leaving the 
single market and customs union. 
The December Joint Report allows for three broad scenarios in this regard. The first is 
one in which a UK-EU free trade agreement somehow manages to uphold the UK’s 
commitments to avoiding a hard border and having no physical checks or controls at 
the Irish border. The efforts by UK ministers to concentrate on having checks and 
controls that are not physically at the border represents a very literal interpretation of 
‘hard border’ and manages to miss the main point. That is, if the UK is heading for a 
‘hard Brexit’ (i.e. withdrawing from the arrangements that serve to make member state 
borders frictionless), this by definition means a hard Irish border. 
If scenario one is in there as a political sop for Brexiteers, the third scenario is a sop for 
EU integrationists. It is a scenario in which the UK aligns with the rules of the internal 
market and customs union – thus effectively a ‘Brexit in name only’. Following the rules 
whilst having so little input into their creation would, it might be said, be a bizarre and 
pointless outcome for an exercise intended to ‘take back control’. 
The most likely outcome is, therefore, one in which ‘specific solutions’ are found for 
Northern Ireland (NI). These could conceivably entail a situation in which there are 
slightly different outcomes for the UK and for NI, such as if the UK has a version of 
‘association’ status (‘CETA-plus’) whilst NI has a version of ‘EEA-minus’. There will need to 
be mechanisms to manage diverging trajectories of the EU and UK without Northern 
Ireland ‘falling in between’. A fully functioning devolved executive and assembly, plus 
the institutions at Strand 2 (North-South) and Strand 3 (British-Irish), will be the minimal 
mechanisms of governance needed to manage this effectively. 
What is currently on the table – the protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the draft 
withdrawal agreement – looks most like a version of ‘specific solutions’. This backstop 
option enabled progress into phase 2 of the talks, but neither the UK nor the EU would 
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be happy if it ended up being the outcome from the strand of talks dedicated to this 
issue. Indeed, the backstop option was roundly rejected by the UK government – not 
because it was so low-ambition for Northern Ireland, but because it would mean 
different treatment of Northern Ireland, to the extent of it being part of the EU’s 
customs territory. From a different perspective, the backstop is disappointingly limited – 
its primary focus is to protect what NI currently enjoys in terms of trade with Ireland, 
but it does so in restricted terms (i.e. it doesn’t extend to other spheres, such as the 
movement of services). 
Nevertheless, the ‘backstop’ option does demonstrate that the EU has held true to its 
commitment to be ‘flexible and imaginative’ – for, in this option, the EU offers de facto 
EEA membership to (a) a sub-national region and (b) to cover just one of the four 
freedoms (i.e. free movement of goods). In principle, the UK could seek to exploit this 
flexibility from the EU for the benefit of Northern Ireland, but this would require 
confirming bespoke arrangements for the region and negotiating a UK-wide customs 
union with the EU. But we are very far from that possibility as yet. 
The ‘colour-coded’ version of the draft protocol indicates that there is little that is 
currently agreed between the UK and the EU on Ireland/Northern Ireland: the 
continuation of the Common Travel Area (already accepted by the EU, as seen in the 
two countries’ exclusion from the Schengen zone), the need to ‘maintain the necessary 
conditions for continued North-South cooperation’ across several areas (such as 
education, tourism, justice and security), the freedom of the UK to continue to build on 
the 1998 Agreement, and the creation of a specialised committee for the 
implementation of this protocol. 
The objectives of protecting Irish citizens’ rights in NI, the rules on state aid for NI, and a 
single electricity market are agreed, but the matter of how these would be achieved is 
not. In the coming few weeks, the UK and EU therefore have to find agreement on a 
wide and complex spectrum of issues for Northern Ireland/Ireland, including free 
movement of goods across the Irish border, agriculture and fisheries, environment, 
supervision and enforcement, and the application of EU regulations in Northern Ireland. 
A strong starting point would be if the UK comes out and clearly states that ‘specific 
solutions’ are necessary to meet the commitments it has made to Northern Ireland, 
both in the Joint Report and in the 1998 Agreement. 
As things stand, however, there is a real risk that – far from enjoying the ‘best of both 
worlds’ – Northern Ireland could fall between the rock of the EU’s determination not to 
bend rules and the hard place of the UK’s intransigence on intra-UK differentiation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
